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Chapter 7 
A Discernible Impact? 
The Influence of Public Opinion 
on EU Policymaking During the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis 
Jennifer R. Wozniak Boyle and Chris Hasselmann 
The European sovereign debt crisis provides an excellent opportunity for 
examining the extent to which public preferences constrain member state 
preferences for EU policy solutions. We examine the influence of public 
opinion on austerity, spending, and regulation on member state preferences 
on 4 major EU solutions to the crisis from 20I0-2011: the initial Greek finan-
cial rescue, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, the reform 
of the Stability and Growth pact, and enhanced EU financial regulation. 
Our analysis reveals that prior to elections and/or when there is a degree of 
fragmentation in the governing party or coalition public opinion constrains 
member state preferences. In the absence of these conditions, however, mem-
ber states ignored public opinion and followed elite preferences concerning 
solutions to the sovereign debt crisis. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
How, when, and to what extent does public opinion matter for EU policymak-
ing? Two paradigms have been put forth to explain the role of public opinion 
in European integration: Lindberg and Schiengold's "permissive consensus" 
and Hooghe and Marks' "constraining dissensus." Lindberg and Scheingold's 
(1970) contention that public opinion is not a significant explanatory factor in 
European integration has been the dominant approach. This model maintains 
that public opinion, while generally favorable toward European integration, 
does not directly influence institutional or policy development in the EU. 
According to this view, European governmental elites receive a permissive 
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cons_ensu~ in favor ~f ~uropean i~tegration, and then determine the specific 
details without pubhc mput, scrutmy or censorship. In accordance with thi 
perspective, Sanders and Toka (2013) argue that EU heads of state ds 
"ft ~ government are m uenced more by economic elites and by extrapolat' 
. . ion 
economic mterest groups than by public opinion. Sanders and Toka (2013 22) find that: ' 
[P]olitical elites' primary sources of opinion cues are not their respective mass 
pu~lics but their respective national economic elites. In sum, in determining 
their own stances towards the EU, political elites appear to place more weight 
on the views of the economically rich and powerful than they do on the views of 
their own constituents. They respond to mass opinion, but not as much as they 
respond to other national elites. 
Hooghe and Marks (2009) agree that the model of "permissive consensus" 
successfully explained the role of public opinion in the European Union from 
1957 through 1991. However, they contend that this was because Europe~ 
integration was primarily concerned with economic policy coordination 
and did not directly impact the majority of Europeans. After 1991, however' 
they maintain that the model of "constraining dissensus" best explains th~ 
relationship of public opinion and European integration. As the EU came to 
enco~~ass !11onetary an~ political union, it "spilled beyond interest group 
bargammg mto the pubhc sphere" (2009, 5). Public opinion on European 
integration became more structured and salient in national politics due in 
large part to national political parties assembling positions on EU institutions 
and policies to suit their national electoral, governing, and policy objectives 
~2009 13, 19). As a result of partisan calculations on economic and identity 
issues, they contend the pro-integration elite has been constrained in pursu-
ing increased integration by an increasingly Euroskeptical public (2009, 9). 
Hooghe and Marks argue that "[m]ass politics trump interest group politics 
when both come into play" (2009, 18). However, while interest groups will 
always seek to influence European integration, public opinion must be mobi-
lized by political parties. Hooghe and Marks maintain that political parties are 
more likely to mobilize public opinion on an EU issue if their stance on the 
issue fits with their ideological tradition, iftheir members are united on it, and 
if they anticipate electoral success from their stance on the issue (2009, 19). 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The foregoing models lead to alternative predictions about the relative 
influence of public and elite opinion on member state preferences in EU 
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licymaking. The model of permissive consensus maintains member state 
po ferences are not a function of public opinion but influenced predominantly 
pre economic elites. Member state preferences on EU policies reflect elite 
brlculations of the economic costs and benefits of specific EU measures. 
~ember state preferences on proposed EU measures are expected to vary 
ccording to whether a member state is an expected net contributor or net ~eneficiary of proposed EU funds_ and regulation_s. For exampl~, preferences 
. net contributor states are predicted to be agamst EU spendmg measures 1
:d in favor of enhanced austerity and regulation; preferences in net recipient 
atates are likely to be in favor of spending and against austerity and economic 
;egulation. Member stat~ g~vernments may _def~ public opinion ~nd e_~brace 
EU policies that contradict it when economic ehtes oppose pubhc opm10n. 
Alternatively, according to the model of constraining dissensus, member 
state preferences are influenced primarily by governing party ideology and 
politics. Governing party ideologies vary from market liberalism on the right 
to regulated capitalism on the left (see Hooghe and Marks 2009, 14-15). 
Liberal and conservative governments should favor austerity and oppose 
spending and regulation; and socialist governments should favor spending 
and regulation as solutions to the debt crisis. Member state preferences will 
be responsive to public opinion when it contradicts governing party ideology 
prior to elections and during coalition governments. 
In order to explore these models, we examine public opinion, elite 
preferences and member state preferences in Germany, France, the UK, 
Spain and Italy on ( 1) the Greek financial rescue; (2) the European Stability 
Mechanism; (3) the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact; and (4) EU 
regulations on the financial sectors. Public opinion on spending, austerity, 
economic coordination and financial regulation is measured during Council 
negotiations over the initiatives via Eurobarometer surveys. Elite preferences 
include opinions of national economic and financial actors and are derived 
from news reports. Member state preferences on the four EU initiatives 
are ascertained from news reports and public documents concerning 
Council meetings on the initiatives. Following Timus (2006) and Nguyen 
(2008) we seek to understand the interaction of public, elite and member 
state preferences. Comparing public, elite preferences and member state 
preferences on major EU initiatives allows us to discern the conditions of 
public influence on EU policymaking. 
THE GREEK FINANCIAL RESCUE 
The debt crisis became apparent in the fall of 2009 when Greece announced 
that its budget deficit was 12.7 percent-more than twice what it had previously 
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reported and more than four times the prescribed EU limit (Agence France 
Press, January 24, 20 I 0). The Greek announcement presented an immediate 
threat not only to the solvency of the Greek government and the people of 
Greece, but to Greece's creditors and the stability of the euro. The Greek 
announcement also revealed the weaknesses of the economic coordinatio 
between the euro economies, in particular the lax monitoring and enforce~ 
ment of the convergence criteria and the stability and growth pact. In shon 
the Greek debt crisis ushered in what has since been termed "the euro crisis.'; 
Member state and Commission solutions for the Greek debt crisis included 
spending and austerity measures to address the Greek budget imbalance and 
economic and financial regulation to prevent the reoccurrence of similar 
crises. Given the sensitivity surrounding such solutions, one might expect the 
Commission to probe public sentiments in its crisis-specific Eurobarometer 
surveys. However, no such question was included prior to the adoption of 
the first Greek financial rescue. Fortunately, the Financial Times was less 
inhibited. In its March 2010 survey of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and 
the UK respondents were queried on the use of public money to rescue cash-
strapped members. 
The results in Table 7.1 follow expectations as countries can be divided in 
two groups based on whether they were likely to be a provider (Germany, the 
UK, and France) or a possible recipient of such funds (Italy and Spain). 1 First 
while there was solidarity in general, in that the EU and its members wer~ 
seen as having a responsibility to help members that encounter financial and/ 
or fiscal trouble, there was considerably less solidarity when it came to helping 
the Greeks in particular. In the latter case, there was particular opposition to 
be found in the UK (56% opposed) and in Germany (61 % opposed). French 
public opinion was nearly evenly split on the question of EU help for Greece 
with 40 percent supportive and 39 percent opposed. Second, there was little 
interest in guaranteeing the debts of another EU member; over 60 percent of 
the respondents in France, the UK, and Germany were opposed to a measure 
that would have placed them at ri sk of paying off the debts of other members. 
In short, there appear to be limits to EU financial solidarity, especially if 
defined as taking on the obligations of another country 's deficit spending. 
Third, in more positive news, there was also little interest in requesting 
Greece to leave the Eurozone while it sorted out its problems. While such 
a "Grexit" was a widely discussed option at the time (spring of 2010), it 
was not widely seen as desirable. Finally, and somewhat disconcertingly for 
Brussels, a plurality of Germans ( 40%) believed their country would be better 
off if it left the Eurozone. In the other 4 Eurozone countries, the plurality felt 
their country would actually be worse off in leaving the Eurozone. 
These attitudes are reflected in member state preferences at the onset 
of the crisis. Germany and France- who held substantial percentages of 
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Table 7.1 Public Support for EU Financial Assistance to Greece 
Germany The UK France Italy Spain 
The EU & its members have a Agree 32°,\, 34 46 59 65 
responsibi lity to help other Disagree 46 35 24 17 20 
members in financ ial/fiscal trouble 
20 25 40 44 60 support EU efforts to help Greece Support 
cope with its budget def1c1t Oppose 61 56 39 33 34 
Your government should guarantee Support 8 15 16 26 30 
the debts of another EU member Oppose 76 61 60 44 44 
Greece should be asked to leave Agree 32 27 19 20 23 
the eurozone while it sorts out its Disagree 40 32 55 53 50 
finances 
25 31 would your country be better or Better 40 26 
worse off if it left the eu rozone? Worse 30 39 47 39 
Source: financial Times, 2010. 
Greek sovereign debt and were the likely largest contributors to a Eurozone 
rescue-preferred Greek budget austerity and not a financial rescue (Barber, 
Wiesmann and Hall 2010). Germany 's initial response to the crisis was to 
insist Greece stabilize its budget by cutting expenditures (Agence France 
Presse 20 lOa; Tilford 2010). Germany rejected calls for an EU or IMF 
rescue package for Greece, arguing that the EU was prohibited from granting 
financial bailouts to Eurozone states and that IMF involvement would 
compromise the European Central Bank (ECB) and thereby EU sovereignty 
(Barber 20 lOa; Peel 20 1 Oa). France recommended austerity and initially 
opposed an EU and/or IMF bailout (Barber and Hall 2010; Barber et al 2010; 
Barber 20 I 0). The ECB also opposed EU and/or IMF bailouts and favored 
Greek budgetary austerity (Atkins 20 lOa; Atkins et al. 2010). Spain, Italy 
and the Commission supported a financial rescue of Greece (Agence France 
Presse, 2010d). 
As sovereign default became an increasingly likely possibility for Greece, 
France and Germany came under increasing domestic and international 
pressure to support a financial rescue of Greece. Despite lukewarm public 
support for EU assistance to Greece and opposition to securing Greek 
debt, French President Sarkozy came to embrace an EU bailout of Greece. 
His reversal- which contradicted French public opinion and his partisan 
ideology- was in line with French economic elites and interests. French banks 
held $67 billion in Greek debt- the largest percentage of any member state 
(Ewing 20 10). BNP Paribas and Societe Generale had among the largest 
exposures of any bank. French bankers, while sanguine in public statements, 
were supportive of the Greek bailout to avoid immediate losses and possible 
contagion to other member states (Fuhhrmans and Moffett 2010). Sarkozy not 
only endorsed an EU-led rescue but sought to convince German Chancellor 
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Merkel of the necessity (Thomson 20 I Oa; 20 IOb ). Merkel was initiaU 
opposed to an EU bailout. Her position was in line with public opinion an~ 
her FDP coalition partners against an EU bailout (Barber and Wiesman 2010). 
Merkel was reported to be persuaded that an EU bailout would not survive the 
German Constitutional Court (Peel and Tait 2010). Additionally, her position 
was likely constrained by her need to secure a CDU-FDP victory in the 
pending North Rhine-Westphalia elections in order to maintain a majority in 
the Bundesrat (Peel 20 IOc). She, however, faced pressure for a bailout from 
German economic elites and interests. Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank 
officials warned of the contagion effects of a Greek default (Barber 20IOc· 
Barber, Wiesman and Hall 2010). Finance minister, Wolfgang Schauble, als~ 
supported an EU bailout of Greece (Economist Intelligence Unit 2010). 
Ultimately, Merkel conceded to a Greek rescue package tied to austerity 
involving both the EU and the IMF. Greece would receive € 110 billion in 
loans over three years (€80 billion from Eurozone states and €30 billion from 
the IMF) in exchange for fiscal consolidation including increased sales taxes, 
and cuts in government salaries and pensions to bring the government deficit 
down to less than 3 percent GDP by 2012 (European Commission, Occasional 
Papers no. 61 ). The EU portion of the bailout would be disbursed in the fonn of 
bilateral loans from Eurozone states proportionate to their ECB contributions 
contingent upon Commission and ECB assessment of conditionality and by 
unanimous agreement of Eurozone states (European Council, 2010c). 
An examination of public, elite and member state preferences surrounding 
the Greek financial rescue reveals that in 3 of the 5 countries, public opinion 
and member state preferences were aligned in the direction predicted 
by economic cost/benefit considerations. Public, elite and member state 
preferences in Spain and Italy were aligned and supportive of the bailout. 
Public, elite and member state preferences in the UK were aligned and 
opposed. While public opinion in France and Germany was opposed to the 
bailout, member state preferences ultimately reflected elite calculations that 
the costs of refusing a rescue were too high. Public opinion against an EU 
bailout in Germany and lukewarm support in France did not prevent member 
states from adopting one. While Gennan public opinion was ultimately 
overruled, it definitely influenced the content of the final rescue package. 
Reflecting German public sentiments, Germany secured increased fiscal 
austerity for Greece and a veto over temporary, intergovernmental Eurozone 
funding. Greece did not receive "free money" but rather loans tied to strict 
conditionality and austerity. German public opinion also influenced the timing 
of the Greek bailout. Merkel maintained opposition to the agreement until as 
close to the North Rhine-Westphalia state election on May 9th as possible. 
The election would not only decide her party's strength in the Bundesrat, 
but was also a precursor to the next national election and referendum on her 
! 
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. . he crisis. In general , public opinion set the bro~d contours of 
bandhng of t 1· pre"erences and affected the timing ot the deal. The 
b . state po icy l' , . G rnern e1 . bl . . . eli'te and member state preferences m ermany 
· ot pu ic op1mon, . d 
interaction that when public opinion competes with_ mterest group an 
dernons~rate~ . . .t has more sway prior to elections and more sway 
onuc eltte op11110n, I 
ec_on ·pect to coalition governments. 
with res 
THE EUROPEAN ST ABILITY MECHANISM 
. . . the Greek rescue were complicated by the fact that the 
Negotiations over . . h· . m for coming to the aid of a Eurozone 
. d t have an ex1st111g mec ams . . 
EU d1 ~o . financial difficulties. The Treaty on the Functwnmg 
rnembe1 state fac~:7an explicitly prohibited the ECB (Article 123) and EU 
of t~e ~urop(~~icle 125) from financially assisting Eurozone member states 
instttut1ons . H wever some analysts argued that the EU could 
. budget constramts. o b t te factng A . l 122 2 which states that when a mem er s a 
t rescue based on rtlc e . d." , moun .a . h severe difficulties caused by natural isasters 
"is senou:ly tt~e::~~:~c:~t beyond its control, the Council, o~ a ~ropo~al 
or except1ona . . rant under certain conditions, Umon financial 
from the Comm1ss1on, may g ' " B· b 20\0c 12). Given 
. h Member State concerned (see ar er , . ass1stan~e t_o t . e EU law there was disagreement on how to proceed with an 
the amb1gmty 111 , 
EU rescue. . . EU financial assistance was measured in the fall 
Public op1111on on , · f th European follo~ing the ~re~k fina~~~:;e~~~;:::e~:~or ~~::e ~~~a~~~e~ a:out t~eaty 
Stab1hty Mee amsm. t h'ch they agreed that "in times 
. . h ere asked the extent o w l 
rev1s10ns, t ey w . , to ive financial help to another 
of crisis, it is desirable for (our country)_ g . ial difficulties?" (EB 
EU Member State facing severe economic and financ . . . s the 
74 1 QC 10) As the results in Table 7 .2 indicate pubhc opm1on ac~os 
· , · . h · t ·ty of support cont111ues to 
member states is supp_ort1ve.u%o:ee~i~~l~ :r:v~~:;s or recipients of financial 
reflect whether countne~ wo have ma·orities that support the fund. 
assistance. France, Spam ~n? Italy 1 \t 'th roucrhly 45 percent in German and UK public opm1on are even y sp I w1 o 
favor of funding financial support: f EU Ii. . I assistance would they 
. . . supportive o nancta ' 
If pubhc op1mon were . . . . return? While respondents were not 
require austerity and con~ittonah~y 111 . . : . in Ma of 2011 they 
queried about conditionality of financial assistance, y . 
t, d fi ·r ending to create economic were asked about their support 0 e ci sp · 
th ,(EB 75 3 QC6). Table 7 .3 indicates that public preferences I~ France 
!~~wGermany ~ontinued to support budget stabilization and aus~~~t~r~~~: 
deficit spending to address the economic recession. In Germany 
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Table 7.2 Public Support for EU Financial Assistance for all EU Member States 
Source: European Commission 2013a, QCl 0. 
Table 7.3 Public Support for Deficit Reduction v. Job Creation 
In an international financial and 
economic crisis, it is necessary 
to increase public deficits to 
create jobs. 
Source: European Commission 2014, QC6. 
Less than 
40% Agree 
Germany 
France 
Between 40-60% 
Agree 
Italy 
Spa in 
More than 
60% Agree 
UK 
respondents were largely unwilling to take on additional debt in the nam 
?f job creation. At the other extreme, more than 60 percent of responden~ 
m the UK supported deficit spending to create jobs. In Italy and Spain, 
~0-60 percent of the p~pulation was willing to increase their country's 
indebtedness to promote JOb creation. It is essential not to read support of a 
national stimulus approaches to national economic woes as translating into 
support for EU-wide Keynesian policies. However, it is reasonable to assume 
that France and German publics who opposed such policies in their own 
countries would oppose them for the EU in general. 
Germany had first proposed a permanent EU bailout mechanism, the 
European Monetary Fund (EMF), in spring 2010 (Peel, Hall and Barber 
2010). The German proposal, which would require treaty revision, was 
to give the EU an IMF-like institution that granted loans upon strict 
conditionality to any Eurozone state experiencing financial and economic 
imbalances (Agence Europe 20 l Od). The EMF proposal was Merkel's 
attempt to reconcile increased pressure from German economic elites, 
France, and the Commission for a financial rescue of Greece with Gennan 
public opinion preferences for budget stabilization and austerity, ensure that 
rescue conform to TEU requirements, and pass muster with the Gennan 
Constitutional Court. While the German suggestion was weakly endorsed by 
the Commission and France, both were skeptical of pursuing treaty revisions 
(Peel, Hall and Barber 20 I 0). A !though member state preferences were not 
emphatically opposed to the EMF proposal, the latter was tabled in favor of 
a temporary, largely intergovernmental €750 billion Eurozone stabilization 
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d e to concerns that a permanent E U fund would require amending kage u . . . 
pac EV treaties, a lengthy process that would bnn~ ~nwanted publtc scrutm~ 
the .. ·ght into member state efforts to stabilize the euro (Pop 20 l 0, 
and ove1s1 
Mahoney 2010.) . . .. 
. · ons over a permanent EU rescue mechamsm were re -1n1t1ated by 
D1scuss1 . . . fi . 1 in the fall of 20 I 0, in the midst of negotiations over a nancia 
Germany · d . J b. d 
kaae for Ireland. France and the UK imme iate y o ~ecte on escue pac e I 
r ds that a permanent fund would require treaty changes (Pee 
the groun . . . 
Od) Merkel however, successfully convmced Sarkozy of supportmg 201 . d" h hanae to bring forth the permanent EU rescue fund by conce mg t e 
treaty c e . . . . f' . 1·· . 
demand for addino automatic nanonal penalties or states v10 atmg German e I 
set in a new Stability and Growth pact (Chaffin, Hall and Pee 
targets · · bl. I d 
201
oa). Despite the Franco-German deal, the Co~1_m1ss1~n pu _i c_ y o.pp~s~ 
revi·s·ion (Aaence France Press 20 !Oe). Bnt1sh Pnme M1mste1 David rreaty 0 · 
Cameron also opposed treaty change for a new permanent fund, an_d was m 
fa total budget freeze (Thomson 2010c). Merkel agreed to support a favor o . 
limit on EU budget growth in excha_nge f~r. the U~ supportmg tr~aty ch~ng~ 
(Wiesmann and Barker 2010). Whtie w1llm~ t_o forgo automa~1c sanctions 
for undisciplined spending, Merkel was unwtll_mg to com~rom1se on treaty 
· ·on as a prerequis ite for a permanent funding mechamsm (Peel 20 I Oe ). 
reVlSI . b ·1 
Undoubtedly, the threat that Germany might not agree to future ai outs 
without the treaty change convinced the majority of member states to agree 
to the permanent bailout fund via a minor treaty rev isio~ . Furthermore, the 
possibility of utilizing an abridged pro~~dure of _unanimous approval by 
European Council for minor treaty revisions, which was allowed by the 
Lisbon Treaty, like ly convinced reluctant member states th~t they_ could 
avoid the time-consuming-and ultimately risky-process 111volv1ng an 
intergovernmental conference followed by national referendums (Phillips 
2010). . 
The European Council agreed to create a new permanent rescue fund, the_ 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), to guarantee financial s~lvency of 
euro member states by following the abbreviated procedure for mmor treaty 
changes (European Council 20 10a). The ESM would be an intergo:ernm_en~al 
organization able to grant loans to Eurozone states on the basis of unan~m1ty 
and conditionality, including "hairc uts" for private bondholders (1b1d). 
Discussions over the lending capacity of the fund were settled relatively 
quickly, with Germany, the Netherlands and Finland conceding to a €500 
billion lending capacity of the fund (Spiegel and Pigna! 201 1 ) . . Whtie 
Germany conceded on the size of the fund , it successfully negotiated a 
lower annual contribution over a 5-year period (Agence Europe 2011 b) . 
Gennany also conceded with respect to financial instruments of the fund . 
While France was in favor of the ESM being able to buy government bonds 
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and engage in bond swaps, Germany and the ECB were less enthusiastic 
this item (Hollinger and Spiegel 2011; Weber 2011). Ultimately, Genna~n 
agreed to allow the ESM to buy government bonds from member states a ~ 
on secondary markets (Spiegel 2011 b; Reuters 2011 ). Despite the rninn 
. ~ 
concessions, Merkel successfully accommodated the German public's desfo 
for fiscal discipline, the German Constitutional Court's requirement of E~ 
treaty revision. and the need to stabilize the euro and prevent the spread of 
sovereign debt crisis. 
The creation of the ESM indicates an approximate alignment of public 
elite and member state preferences in favor of an EU fund to assist membe; 
states facing economic and financial crises. Preferences ultimately reflected 
~he calculation that the ~osts of failing to create a fund to address budgetary 
unbalances and fiscal cnses across EU member states and stabilize the euro 
were too high. The ESM was to involve strict conditionality and was not a 
stimulus package. Therefore, it did not contradict French and German public 
opinion against stimulus spending. Most importantly, German public opinion 
on financial assistance for member states had evolved. While in March 2010 
only 32 percent had supported "EU efforts to help member states in financiaV 
fiscal trouble" (Table 7.1 ), by September 2010, 45.96 percent were supportive 
of EU financial assistance (Table 7.2). Prior to the Greek bailout, the German 
public did not support EU financial assistance. While Chancellor Merkel 
dropped her EMF proposal in spring 20 l 0, she acceded to German financial 
and banking interests to agree to a Greek bailout against public preferences. 
Merkel was constrained by public opinion on the Greek rescue in spring 
2010; but by the fall of 2010 German public opinion had come closer to the 
preferences of German economic elites. 
REFORMING THE ST ABILITY AND GROWTH PACT 
While recipients of bailout funds could have austerity forced upon them as 
a condition of receiving aid , the question remained how best to regulate the 
behavior of all Eurozone members to avoid a repeat of the crisis in the future. 
This need to regulate state behavior had been the logic behind the first Sta-
bility and Growth Pact introduced alongside the euro in 1999. The failings 
of this first pact are well known and not addressed here ; however, following 
the creation of the ESM, attention swung back to how best to regulate state 
behavior. In fact, the paucity of rules governing member state economic and 
financial policies, the weaknesses of EU supervisory and enforcement pow-
ers , and the lack of member state compliance with the Stability and Growth 
Pact were widely seen as having contributed to the crisis (Barber 2009; 
2010a; Agence Europe 2010b; Nelson et al. 2010). 
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. S anish Prime Minister Zapatero, who h~ld ~he 
In the win. ter of 201? fPM .. ·t ' . put enhancincr economic coord111at10n 
t. h Council o ims ers , o d . 
P esidency o t ~ . . a that the EU should consider a optmg r f his agenda arcrumo 1· . 2010) 
at the top o . . f iied t~ meet agreed upon targets (Europa tt1cs .. 
ctions for states that a . . . would seek to strengthen economic 
. ~:e Commission al~o. a~:ou~ceedS~~~~l~:y and Growth Pact (Chaffin. 20.10; 
oordination by retoim~ g supported increased economic coord111at1on ~oence Europe 201 Oa). erm~n\ with Spain ' s initial call for sanctions . •o~ Eurozone member statebs ~n f'.neor of a range of sanctions including the 1
' , , eported to e Ill av . t' 
Germany was : ral or Cohesion funds , and suspendmg vo mg 
withholding of EU ·~t~u~t~tates that violated fi scal rules (Agence Europe 
rights in th~ Cou~c1 ~~n Hall Hope and Wiesmann 20 I 0). The UK was 
2010d; Wolt 2~ 10, Chad fi 'cal di,scipline by member states but was opposed 
not opposed to mcrease s . f EU i·nstitutions (Mallet 201 L). On 
. h f cement powe1 o . 
to increas1~g t ~ en ~~bate stood France, which remain~d opposed to .more 
the other side of ~he . (Ch ffi Hall Hope and W1esmann 2010, Hall 
. gent automatic sanct10ns a n, ' 
stnn 
2010). e members tabled the discussion for future 
Faced. with an impasse, E~~~~~~ 1 Oc). Tabling the negotiation over toug.h~r 
negotiations (European ~ou G . that contradicted German public s 
cession by ermany · · 
sanctions was a con . ent fiscal discipline as a way out of the cns1s. 
insistence on more stnng M h 20 l 0 summit, Germany conceded to 
Recalling that at the very samefi ar~ 1 escue without treaty revision makes 
. the Greek nancia r h'l EU involvement Ill . II the more remarkable. W I e 
. 1 · tougher sanctions a the German cap1tu auon on . . . . b th cases Chancellor Merkel 
. d b bhc op1111on Ill o . , 
initially constra1ne y pu . . elites and other EU member 
. b d .t p essure lrom economic 
ultimately d1so eye . ' . r . kb ·1 ut took precedence over enhanced 
states to agree to an immediate Gree a1 o 
economic coordination. . d budgetary coordination of 
. . h · a the economic an 
Public opmron on en ancmo . su ortive across all member sta~es. 
EU member states was overwhelmmg fpp d or opposed strengthemng 
k d hether they a vore 
Respondents were as ~ w d the convercrence between the 
" .. . European economic governance asn . . ;, .(EB 76 l QA 10 2). Table 7.4 
. · f h EU Member tates · -
budgetary pohc1es o. t e . rt for strict penalties to enforce debt and 
indicates overwhelming public ~u~p~d , ·orities in France, Germany , Italy 
deficit limits on member stat~s . o i . maJ The EU average public support 
and the UK support a~tomatlc san~t10n.s. the averae:e EU support . Public 
is 78%! German public support mm.oi s t'ons a~e consistent with the 
. f automatic sane i · preferences m Germany or_ . . I' . t home and for other member 
Gennan public's support of fis~al discip 11~ aUK and Spain flies in the face 
states. Majority public support m France, t eh. h . n defic 'its many times in 
· I' th states w 1c ra · ' 
of the budcretary practices 0 ese · f 2007- ?0IO. In all 
"' . . d th pact measures rom -excess of the stability an grow 
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Table 7.4 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Spain 
UK 
EU Average 
Jem11fer R. Wo::,niak Bovie and Chris Hasselmann 
Public Support for Enhanced Economic Coordination 
Strongly in Favor Fairly in Favor Fairly Opposed 
35.1 % 46.1 13.5 
42.1 
25.0 
40.1 
22 .9 
32.1 5 
34.4 
61.0 
41.6 
44.7 
45.85 
16.8 
11.4 
11.6 
20.5 
16.08 
Source: European Commission 201 Jb, QA 10_2. 
Strongly Opposed 
5.3 
6.7 
2.7 
6.8 
11.9 
5.93 
likelihood, respondents were not imagining that penalties would accrue to 
their own countries, but apply to the Greeks. 
The Commission re-instigated discussion of reforming economic 
governance and coordination by proposing six legislative proposals ("six-
pack" ) aimed at augmenting the scope and enforcement of the Stability and 
Growth Pact targets. The legislation would subject Eurozone member states 
to near-automatic fines for not meeting debt, deficit and competitiveness 
targets (European Commission 20 I Ob). Member states were divided into 
two camps on the Commission proposals. Germany and the UK (joined 
by the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland) argued that the Commission's 
proposed sanctions were too soft and needed to be more aggressive and more 
automatic (Spiegel 3010; Peel, Parker, Chaffin and Hall 20 IO; Chaffin and 
Spiegel 20 I 0). The European Central Bank also favored tougher sanctions, 
as did the European Parliament (Chaffin, Peel and Wilson 20 I 0, Agence 
Europe 20 I Og). France, Italy, Spain and Belgium were opposed to automatic 
sanctions (Chaffin, Peel and Wi Ison 20 l 0). 
Significant progress on the Commission proposals was made when Germany 
agreed to drop its insistence that the legislative proposals contain automatic 
sanctions in exchange for France supporting treaty revision to create the ESM 
(Chaffin, Hall and Peel 20 I 0). The European Council endorsed the Commission's 
proposal for near-automatic sanctions (Agence Europe 20 I Oh). Member states 
haggled over the details of the fiscal targets and enforcement mechanisms for 
another full year until finally adopting the Commission proposals in November 
2011 (Agence Europe 20 I le). The new proposals kept the Stability and Growth 
Pact national deficit limit of 3 percent GDP and debt limit of 60 percent GDP 
but enhanced monitoring and surveillance mechanisms to prevent states from 
breaching these limits and enhanced corrective mechanisms to encourage states 
that had exceeded the limits to bring spending back in line. States agreed to 
pace spending growth to GDP growth, and to allow the Commission to impose 
fines of 0.2 percent GDP upon Eurozone members that did not bring their debt 
and deficits back into conformity unless states agreed by qualified majority to 
prevent the fines (Council 2011 ). While a definite enhancement of economic 
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oordination and governance procedures, the six-pack reform of the Stability ~nd Growth pact was definitely less comprehensive and less forceful than 
Gennany would have liked. . 
Having achieved a significant but not dramatic increase in economic 
governance via the six-pack reg:ilat~ons , Germany and .F'.·ance propo~~d a 
more ambitious set of fiscal coordination measures known 1mtially as the pact 
for competitiveness" for the Eurozone countries (Peel 2011 ). The proposal 
included recommendations for member states to coordinate wage and tax 
policies, pension systems, and to adopt balanced budget legislati?1~s. (~ollinger 
and Spiegel 2011 a). Initial responses to the Franco-German 1mtiat1ve were 
negative: Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Poland were among 
the states objecting to specific provisions and/or to the exclus10n of non-euro 
member states (Hollinger and Spiegel 2011 b ). EU trade unions were also 
repoited to be against the initiative (Agence Europe 20 I la). Com1:nission 
President Barroso and European Council President Van Rompuy put torward 
a sliahtly revised "pact for the euro" that retained most of the Franco-German 
provisions but substituted Commission for member state overs.ight .(Spie~el 
2011 a). Eurozone member states plus Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, L1thuama, 
Poland and Romania agreed to the intergovernmental, non-binding euro 
plus pact at the March 2011 European Council (European Council 20.1.1 , 
Annex I). Participating member states committed themselves to pursue specific 
targets aimed at increasing competitiveness and promoting employ'.11~nt , 
fiscal discipline and the stability of financial institutions. The Comm1ss1on 
would monitor and make recommendations for member state regulation and 
compliance, but compliance would be wholly voluntary. While definitely an 
expansion of the scope of economic coordination, since the pact did not include 
any requirement of compliance, member states were not bound to implement 
it. Given that Gem1any had fought for tough fiscal targets and sanctions for 
violators in the six-pack negotiations, it is difficult to view the euro plus pact as 
a clear, resounding victory for Ge1many. Nonetheless, recalling that Germany 
conceded to a larger than desired ESM contribution (albeit over a longer time 
period) at the very same summit that it won agreement to the euro plus pact 
leads one to conclude that it exchanged greater EU spending on its part to secure 
the promise of stricter fiscal discipline on the pait of other member states. 
Public opinion and member state preferences are strikingly divergent on 
the six-pack and euro plus pact reforms to the Stability and Growth pact in 
all cases except Germany . In all member states public opinion favored tough 
penalties for states failing to meet economic and fiscal targets. Despite public 
support, France, Spain and Italy were initially opposed to tough, automatic 
sanctions. Their preferences likely reflected economic analyses indicating 
the likelihood of their accruing penalties. Only in Germany did the member 
state preference reflect public sentiments. Yet, the German government 
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compromised on the size and enforcement of the targets and penalties 
originally desired. Intergovernmental bargaining actually brought the EU 
reforms on the Stability and Growth pact closer to average EU public opinion 
on economic coordination. 
REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
The six-pack and the euro plus pact were focused on regulating the economic 
and fiscal discipline of states. A second line of policy was squarely aimed 
at regulating the behavior of private financial actors, who were widely seen 
as having caused the crisis in the first place. Setting aside the assessment of 
blame, much of 20I0-2011 was spent debating how best and how much to reg-
ulate the financial markets so that this kind of banking turned sovereign debt 
crisis would never repeat itself. This kind of policy search is part and parcel of 
any bailout effort due to the moral hazard created by the bailouts themselves. 
As Table 7.5 makes clear, the public was quite adamant that the financial 
sector be brought to task for its role in crisis. Almost any proposal to curb 
the financial market was going to be embraced loudly and with considerable 
shadenfreude. It is also clear that the British were essentially in lockstep with 
their continental cousins. So while the Briti sh government remains the most 
vocal critic of such measures, there is little evidence to suggest that the British 
public shares its government's concerns. In fact, when it comes to regulating 
wages in the financial sector, the British are more virulent supporters than the 
EU as a whole (53.4% vs. 48.6% ). 
The Commission initially recommended strengthening the regulation 
and supervision of financial sectors including banking, insurance, pensions 
Table 7.5 Public Support for Regulation of the Financial Industry 
Strongly Fa irly Fairly Strongly 
in Favor' in Favor Opposed Opposed 
Tougher rules on tax avoidance and EU: 62 .5% 30.5 5.4 1.6 
tax havens UK: 64.0 29.2 4 .5 2.3 
The introduction of a tax on profits EU: 52.0 35 .6 9.0 3.4 
made by banks UK: 56.3 31.3 8.5 4.0 
The introduction of tax on financia l EU: 33.1 37 .8 20.2 8.9 
transactions UK: 23.2 36.0 25 .2 15 .6 
The regulat ion of wages in the EU: 48.6 39. 1 9 .2 3.1 
fi nancial sector (i.e., trader's UK: 53.4 33.8 8.7 4.1 
bonuses) 
Increasing transparency of financial EU: 57.0 38.0 4.0 1.0 
markets UK: 54.3 40.4 4 .1 1.2 
'The percentage of responrlents across the EU, excl ud ing the UK, w ith the UK figures prov ided separately. 
Source: European Commission, 2014, QCS. 
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and hedge funds in 2009. EU regulatory standards for hedge funds were 
aimed at improving their tran sparency (European Commission 2009f). The 
commission proposed a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to identify 
potential threats to the stability of the EU financial system; and a European 
System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) for banking, insurance and pensions 
industries (see European Commission 2009b-e). The ESFS would be made 
up of ex isting national level supervisors working in conjunction with three 
new agencies: European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and European Securities and 
markets Authority (ESMA). 
Negotiations over the creation of the European System of Financial 
Supervi sion , including the European Systemic Risk Board and three European 
Supervi sory Authorities for banking, in surance and pensions proceeded 
quickly with the Council agreeing to significantly diluted Commission 
proposals in December 2009 (Willis 2009). The European Parliament, which 
shared legislative power with the Counci l, objected to the member states 
giving-largely at the behest of the UK-national financial authorities veto 
power over the European authorities (Willis 20 lOa). The European Parliament 
largely conceded to the Council position, approving the regulations despite 
failing to secure desired direct and independent enforcement authority for the 
ESRB and ES As (Willis 201 Ob). Council negotiations over the hedge funds 
directive did not begin until spring 20 I 0. Member states were in two camps. 
The UK led the opposition to the proposed standards. The UK argued that the 
regulations would disadvantage EU hedge funds in international competition 
and make it more difficult for non-EU funds to do business in Europe thereby 
putting a se rious damper on the industry in Europe (Financial Times 20 I Oa). 
Joining the UK in opposition to the hedge funds directive were Austria, 
Czech Republic, Ireland, Malta and Sweden (ibid). France and Germany both 
supp011ed the hedge fund directive (Financial Times 2010b). In May of2010, 
the Counci l of Ministers approved the hedge fund directive, outvoting the UK 
and other opponents in a qualified majority vote (Financial Times 20 I Ob). 
Member state preferences and public opinion on EU Regulation of the 
Financial Sector were aligned and favorable to enhanced EU regulation in 
Germany, France, Italy and Spain. However, the UK government position was 
not aligned with UK public opinion. Prime Minister Cameron's consistent 
opposition to enhanced regulation defied UK public support for it. Negotiations 
over the European System of Financial Supervision regulations and the hedge 
funds directive followed similar trajectories. In both negotiations, the UK was 
able to water down the Commission proposals to a greater extent than France, 
Germany or the European Parliament initially desired. The question of why 
member states agreed to less stlingent financial regulation when EU public 
opinion was strongly in favor of regulation can be understood if one understands 
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public opinion as constraining but not determining member state preference 
Heads of state and government in France and Germany had a "permissivs. 
consensus" broadly in favor of enhanced regulation , but they also neede~ 
to be accountable to the noisy and persistent lobbyists for the wealthy and 
powerful financial industries. A watered-down set of regulations allowed them 
to accommodate both public and elite opinion. The lack of impact of British 
public opinion on the UK position is an example of public opinion losing to elite 
interest. Despite be ing in a coalition government, Prime Minister Cameron was 
not facing elections. Furthermore, Cameron would be unlikely to face public 
reprisal for defending UK financial and economic interests in Brussels. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing exploration of public opinion and government preferences dur-
ing EU negotiations on the financial and sovereign debt crisis has sought to 
clarify the influe nce of public opinion on member state preferences and inter-
governmental bargaining. We found that the "permi ssive consensus" granted 
to heads of state or government specifies a general po licy preference and sets 
broad paramete rs within which they seek to stay. However, member states 
must also be responsive to economic elites and inte rests, which may have 
demands that run counter to majority public opinion. In such instances, we 
found that government preferences and intergovernmental agreements drifted 
beyond the parameters predicted by majority public opinion. For example, 
whi~e majority public opinion in Germany, France and the UK was more sup-
portive of austerity over spending during the financial crisis, the EU utilized 
both remedies in tandem, to bolster the banking and financial industries and 
stabilize the euro. Similarly, with respect to inc reased fin ancial regulation, the 
final EU regulations were far less aggressive than public opinion in Germany, 
France and the UK would have predicted. 
NOTE 
I. It should be noted, however, that France is also considered among the group of 
countries that mi ght, if things get bad enough, end up need ing assistance too. Forbes 
has gone as far as to say that "fn fact, it's France-not Greece or Spain-that now 
poses the greatest threat to the euro 's survi val" (Tully 20 13, I). A similar concern was 
raised a year earlier by The Eco11omist (see Economist 20 12). So while the crisis was 
primarily about Portugal, Ireland, and Greece (the PIGs) at the outset, and that Italy 
and Spain were the two large countries seen most at ri sk of a contagion effect (making 
it PTT GS), France has been seen as a distant and horrifying prospect given its debt and 
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competiveness issues. It should also be noted that the French governmem rejects this 
poi nt of view (see for example The Telegraph 20 12). 
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